You can watch the GCF B45 proceedings live and on demand here: https://www.greenclimate.fund/boardroom/meeting/b45 

Full transcript of the interventions by the GCF Observer Network are available here: https://www.gcfwatch.org/resources/board-meeting-resources/45th-board-meeting-of-the-gcf 

Detailed daily updates from APMDD are available here: https://docs.google.com/document/d/1m7n-td3WavOTYc5DN9MAnafC6gtLcLszZS51nJla-_s/edit?usp=sharing

Daily Highlights 

Day 1 | June 29, 2026

• The Board resolved to discuss an Arrear Policy at B.46. The BM from Ghana, on behalf of the African Group of Negotiators (AGN), proposed to add an Arrear Policy to the Agenda for B.45. However, the Board resolved to discuss these items under Other Matters, which will be a part of the agenda for the next Board Meeting, and in future Board Meetings.
• The Secretariat presented a revised commitment authority methodology. As part of the Report on the Activities of the Secretariat, the Secretariat proposed a “risk-based approach” to calculating the commitment authority, where the Fund would estimate the resources it must hold to remain resilient, even under stress conditions, modelled from historical assumptions. All surplus resources would then be counted towards the commitment authority. However, the Board did not come to an agreement on whether this revised methodology should be adopted.
• Developed country BMs were highly supportive of this revision, lauding that it would increase programming capacity by nearly 6 billion and could be complemented by stronger private sector investment. The BM from Japan said that it was unrealistic to expect public finance alone to deliver on the scale of need.
• Developing country BMs stressed the need for greater prudence and stronger safeguards. They warned that the Fund, as a relatively young institution, cannot yet rely on modelling for determining the commitment authority. They also recommended launching only a pilot implementation phase of this new framework that will confirm it will not trigger changes in funding commitments or reduce the share of grants in the instrument mix. Process-wise, they were concerned that the Board was simply being asked to take note of a major change as part of an informational document, rather than carefully and separately deliberate such a change.
• The IPAG recommended establishing a dedicated facility for Indigenous Peoples. Based on inputs from the 8th Formal Meeting of the IPAG and the GCF Global Conference with Indigenous Peoples, the IPAG recommended establishing a window for IPs, with a dedicated framework and resources. The IPAG the Secretariat’s work to prepare options for direct access for IPs by B.46.
• The Secretariat prepared a draft Arrangements for the Third Replenishment which resulted in wide divergence. The Secretariat’s draft included the following details for the Third Replenishment, which was discussed at length by the Board and failed to reach consensus on Day 1:

Term: January 1, 2028 to December 31, 2031 Structure, Format, Timing: 2-3 consultation meetings (first in Q4 of 2026, second in Q1 of 2027, and potentially a third in Q2 of 2027), culminating in a pledging conference by Q4 of 2027 Participants: Open to all potential contributors, Board Members and alternates, four Active Observers, the UNFCCC, the 4 MCFs Chairperson: A chairperson may be appointed, in consultation with the Board, to chair meetings Inputs: GCF impacts and results, the Independent Evaluation Unit’s Third Performance Review of the GCF, USP-3 and expected results, investment case, and two policies:  Policy for Contributions – The standard Policy for Contributions for the Third Replenishment will be focused on public sector inputs from Parties and Non-Parties to the UNFCCC. The Secretariat is also proposing to widen the range of contribution types to introduce contributor guarantees as a top priority, and remove caps on the aggregate share of loan and capital contributions as well as individual loan contributions. New Policy on Other Sources – The Secretariat will prepare an additional Policy on Other Sources, including alternative sources such as carbon markets.

• Developing and developed country BMs were divided on a potential expansion of the contributor base to include developing countries and the private sector. Developing country BMs highlighted that developed countries have a legal obligation to deliver climate finance and serve as the primary contributors to the GCF. They emphasized that any expansion of the contributor base should only be supplementary and should not serve as a substitute for the delivery of these obligations. Meanwhile, the BM from France asserted that developed countries do not have an obligation to deliver resources specifically to the GCF, but only have an obligation to deliver climate finance in general, which they can deliver through other funds. Developed country BMs also argued that refusing to expand the contributor base, and instead blaming the handful of remaining traditional contributors, will further discourage developed countries from contributing to the Fund. 
• Developing and developed country BMs also fiercely debated the Policies for Contributions and Alternative Sources. Developing country BMs opposed the inclusion of a new Policy on Alternative Sources, as well as new provisions such as ‘contributor guarantees’ and revisions to debt limits in the Policy for Contributions. They stressed that adding these elements would pre-judge the later deliberations of the Board dedicated to the Policy for Contributions, and risk exacerbating debt burdens in developing countries. They favored an Arrangements document that, according to past practice, only indicated the need for a Policy for Contributions, with no substantiation of the content of such policy. Developed country BMs were, however, elated to see a diversification in funding inputs, which they said would encourage private sector mobilization and developed country contributions. The BM from Germany recommended other innovative inputs such as debt-for-climate swaps, while the BM from Japan said that public finance alone would not be sufficient to meet the scale of need.
• The BM from France and the BM from Saudi Arabia were engaged in a brief spat on whether “wealthy Gulf countries” should contribute to the GCF. The BM from France said that he was sorry that GCF-2 did not result in pledges from “wealthy Gulf countries” despite recruiting an Egyptian diplomat as the facilitator of that replenishment process. The BM from Saudi Arabia said that Gulf countries and other Arab states were top providers of Official Development Assistance (ODA). However, he continued, ODA must be delineated from climate finance, because climate finance should take into account historical emissions.

Day 2 | June 30, 2026

• The Secretariat disclosed the UK government’s decision to amend its GCF-2 contribution agreement to reflect its halved pledge. On May 12, 2026, the UK government notified the Secretariat of its decision to revise its GCF-2 pledge from £1.6 billion to £0.8 billion, a 50% reduction.  This adjustment has been reflected in the total pledged amount for GCF-2, which has since decreased from $10.6 billion to $9.6 billion. The CSO AO from Developing Countries, Kairos Dela Cruz, slammed the unprecedented pledge cut as non-fulfillment of a pledge already confirmed via a signed contribution agreement, and therefore legally owed. He argued that such a non-fulfillment has not happened in the history of the Fund and is not provided for in any policy or agreement. 
• Developed country BMs were concerned about the small share of mitigation projects for Funding Proposals presented at B.45. They were alarmed that mitigation only comprised 11% of financing for this set of FPs and urged further private sector engagement for mitigation projects and particularly REDD+. The BM from Kenya responded to this by saying that developing countries have contributed little to historical emissions and have to be strongly biased towards industrialization and poverty eradication as part of repairing historical injustices. She thus welcomed the focus on adaptation in alignment with developing country priorities.

Day 3 | July 1, 2026

• BMs disagreed on whether the Arrangements for the Third Replenishment should serve as a business case or a procedural decision. Developed country BMs wanted the Arrangements to include references to leveraging additional funds, generating new sources, securing more donors, and strengthening private sector involvement, to serve as an investment signal for potential contributors. They said that these elements would better justify to taxpayers and parliaments the decision to contribute to GCF. Developing country BMs clarified that the Arrangements is not meant to discuss the strategy of the Fund, or identify the types of financial inputs that the Fund can receive. Rather, the Arrangements is only a procedural decision to launch the replenishment process.
• The BM from Pakistan criticized the BM from Germany’s use of the term “donor.” Throughout the deliberations on the Arrangements for the Third Replenishment, the BM from Germany repeatedly used the term “donors” to refer to contributors. The BM from Pakistan said, “Don’t tell us that you are donors, you are debtors,” highlighting the climate debt owed by developed countries to developing countries. Likewise, the CSO AO from Developed Countries, Tara Daniel, said that developed countries are not donors that can unilaterally steer the direction of the Fund.
• The Board approved the following Funding Proposals:
  • SAP070: Building Flood Resilient Community through Adaptive Livelihood and Runoff Management in Petanglong Area of Central Java Province of Indonesia (BRAVE)
  • SAP071: Building Climate Resilience of Forest Dependent Communities through Enhanced Livelihood Opportunities and Local Capacity in Karnali Province, Nepal
  • SAP072: WATER-RES Enhancing the ability to address the risks of water scarcity in areas most affected by climate change and water shortage in Syria
  • FP303: Climate Resilient Water Sanitation and Hygiene (WASH) and Disaster Management services for vulnerable children in the Central African Republic (CRDM-CAR)
  • FP304: Enhancing Sustainable Land Management and Climate-Resilient Agri-Food Systems in Cote d’Ivoire (LARACI)
  • FP305: Building the resilience of Togo’s national health system and vulnerable communities to climate-sensitive health outcomes
  • FP306: Forest Landscape Restoration for Climate Benefits and Resilience (Fiji FLR)
  • FP307: Mekong Earth Regeneration Fund (MERF)
  • FP308: Improving climate resilience of vulnerable communities and enabling conditions for local climate action in Tajikistan
  • FP309: Resilient Water Systems for All (RWS4All): Deep Adaptation Pathways for Water Infrastructure in the Kyrgyz Republic and Tajikistan

• The Board approved the following Accreditation Proposals:
  • APL173: Banco de Desarrollo del Ecuador B.P. (Ecuador)
  • APL174: Corporacion Financiera de Desarrollo S.A. (Peru)
  • APL175: Mali-Folkecenter – NYETAA (Mali)
  • APL176: PT Indonesia Infrastructure Finance (Indonesia)
  • APL177: Town Development Fund (Nepal)
  • APL178: Equity Group Holdings PLC (Kenya)
  • APL179: Climate Fund Managers B.V. (IAE)
  • APL180: HELVETAS Swiss Intercooperation (IAE)
  • APL181: People in Need (IAE)

• The Board adopted the Updated Gender Action Plan for 2026-2031. This adoption came after the Secretariat’s accommodation of comments from BMs. In particular, developing country BMs sought to remove mentions of FCAS and intersectionalities, which to them represented a departure to the Convention and Paris Agreement and their definition of vulnerability. Meanwhile, developed country BMs sought to strengthen reporting and monitoring of gender-focused indicators and outcomes.

Day 4 | July 2, 2026

• The Board endorsed the revised commitment authority methodology discussed on Day 1 provided that it would be tested through an initial implementation period, and confirm that it will not affect the ability of the Fund to honor funding commitments already approved.
• The Secretariat consulted the Board on possible alternatives to the No-Objection Letter, revealing diverging views on country ownership. As part of the Country Ownership Guidelines, the No Objection Letter (NOL) currently serves as the single instrument through which countries express No-Objection to a proposed project by an Accredited Entity (AE). The Secretariat consulted the Board on whether it agrees with the approach to explore alternatives to the NOL particularly for private sector and multi-country projects. Developing country BMs were not in favor of this approach, fearing that private sector and multi-country projects would bypass NDAs and country priorities. They also flagged the transparency and implementation issues that countries face with multi-country programmes, as many of these programmes do not provide for any country-level information prior to implementation, or remain without any country-level implementation. Developed country BMs, however, were pleased that alternatives to the NOL could reduce barriers and burdens for private sector engagement. Meanwhile, the BM from Maldives believed that the differentiated approach would also benefit SIDS and other capacity-constrained countries. 
• The Board adopted the Arrangements for the Third Replenishment following a new draft. This draft largely adapted the Arrangements for the Second Replenishment, but included language on “a range of contribution types and modalities,” and two policies for contributions, including a separate policy for contributions from other sources. The BM from Saudi Arabia proposed to include the following language in the decision text: “Affirms that the replenishment process will be conducted in line with the principles and provisions of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change and the Paris Agreement,” to no objection.
• Developed country BMs were disappointed that the text largely reverted to GCF-2, while developing countries reiterated the need to align with past practice. They said that the text was based on an “outdated” document that does not reflect changing contexts. They also argued that the original draft served as a much better basis for the replenishment since it would have provided for a strong business case and thus maximized the amount of resources that could be contributed to the Fund. Meanwhile, developing country BMs reiterated the need to keep the Arrangements as a procedural document, consistent with the practice from GCF-2. They repeated the need to not prejudge the coming deliberations by the Board on the coming policies for contributions. Lastly, they argued that there have been no changes in the international context that render the Convention and the Paris Agreement irrelevant.
• Developing country BMs also condemned the tactics of intimidation and divide-and-rule wielded by developed country BMs. In particular, the BM from Germany said that she could not comprehend why LDCs and SIDS representatives would be content with reverting to GCF-2, arguing that rejecting additional sources and modalities “will make your countries poorer.” The BM from Ghana rebutted that GCF funds are not going to make developing countries richer, but are only intended to support developing countries in addressing climate-related challenges caused by developed countries. The BM from Pakistan also intervened and said that GCF funds are intended to address historical responsibility and climate debt, explaining that LDCs and SIDS were “way richer before certain countries came and robbed them of their wealth.” Further, the BM from Gambia said that if partners truly prioritized LDCs, the LDCs Fund would not be underresourced, and LDCs would not be receiving less than other larger developing countries. Meanwhile, the BM from Saudi Arabia said that calling developing countries poor is antithetical to multilateralism. 
• Developing country BMs urged the removal of language on “fragile and conflict-affected states.” Across many agenda items, including those from previous days, “fragile and conflict-affected states” were mentioned, which some developing country BMs urged to remove since such language was without basis in the Governing Instrument, Convention, or Paris Agreement.